We report the results of meta-analyses on 3 types of free-response study: (a) ganzfeld (a technique that enhances a communication anomaly referred to as "psi"); (b) nonganzfeld noise reduction using alleged psi-enhancing techniques such as dream psi, meditation, relaxation, or hypnosis; and (c) standard free response (nonganzfeld, no noise reduction). For the period 1997-2008, a homogeneous data set of 29 ganzfeld studies yielded a mean effect size of 0.142 (Stouffer Z ϭ 5.48, p ϭ 2.13 ϫ 10 Ϫ8 ). A homogeneous nonganzfeld noise reduction data set of 16 studies yielded a mean effect size of 0.110 (Stouffer Z ϭ 3.35, p ϭ 2.08 ϫ 10 Ϫ4 ), and a homogeneous data set of 14 standard free-response studies produced a weak negative mean effect size of Ϫ0.029 (Stouffer Z ϭ Ϫ2.29, p ϭ .989). The mean effect size value of the ganzfeld database were significantly higher than the mean effect size of the nonganzfeld noise reduction and the standard free-response databases. We also found that selected participants (believers in the paranormal, meditators, etc.) had a performance advantage over unselected participants, but only if they were in the ganzfeld condition.
The 20th century was an era in which a number of scientific revolutions took place, indicated not only by technological breakthroughs but also by changes in, and challenges to, our understanding of the nature of the universe. Major conventional perspectives in physics (classical and mechanical) were challenged by models such as relativity theory and quantum mechanics that gave more accurate pictures of the physical world. Likewise, in the sciences of the mind (i.e., psychology, neuropsychology, and philosophy), there were revolutions that upturned conventional viewpoints in our understanding of mental-cognitive processes and brain events. A paradigmatic shift in consciousness usually requires a huge leap of faith, and it is noted that such changes in mindset are never made immediately or easily in any given scientific community or epoch (Collins & Pinch, 1982) .
In that same century, relegated to the sidelines of these major events, was the equally controversial subject of an anomaly known as "psi"-a shorthand term for psychic functioning, specifically categorized as either extrasensory perception (i.e., ESP, which covers telepathy, clairvoyance, and precognition) or psychokinesis (i.e., PK, which refers to paranormal mental influence on matter). Telepathy refers to the "paranormal acquisition of information concerning the thoughts, feelings or activity of another conscious being" (Thalbourne, 2003, p. 125) . Clairvoyance is defined as "paranormal acquisition of information concerning an object or contemporary physical event; in contrast to telepathy, the information is assumed to derive directly from an external physical source" (Thalbourne, 2003, p. 18) . Precognition is defined as "a form of extrasensory perception in which the target is some future event that cannot be deduced from normally known data in the present" (Thalbourne, 2003, p. 90) . Related to telepathy is "remote viewing," which Thalbourne (2003) defines as "a neutral term for general extrasensory perception . . . especially in the context of an experimental design wherein a percipient [perceiver/receiver] attempts to describe the surroundings of a geographically distant agent [sender]" (p. 107) .
Major laboratory efforts to determine the likelihood and extent of both hypothesized effects (ESP and PK) were first undertaken by J. B. Rhine in the 1930s, with his card-guessing (Rhine et al., 1940 (Rhine et al., /1966 and dice-throwing studies (Rhine, 1948 (Rhine, /1954 ). Card guessing is described as a form of "forced-choice" experiment because there are a limited number of choices, and the participant is forced to guess the target from a limited set of symbols (usually one of five in the card-guessing design: square, cross, circle, star, and wavy lines). Years later, meta-analytic studies on cardguessing and dice-throwing databases yielded statistically significant effects Radin & Ferrari, 1991) .
Departures from the Rhinean paradigms in the 1960s and 1970s saw a shift in interest toward "free-response" designs (e.g., Honorton, 1977) . Free response is a term that "describes any test of ESP in which the range of possible targets is relatively unlimited and is unknown to the percipient [perceiver/receiver]" (Thalbourne, 2003, p. 44) . Picture guessing is typically free response, although the perceiver is usually presented with, say, four randomly selected pictures (target plus three decoys), none of which have been sighted by the perceiver until he or she is required to identify the target among the four pictures. The perceiver is restricted to four pictures, but the free-response component manifests in the "mentation" (i.e., the stream of images, thoughts, and ideas in the mind of the perceiver that are recorded to assist the judging process). It is the variability in content of the mentation report itself that suggests that the range of possible targets is virtually unlimited and unknown to the perceiver. Along with card guessing and dice throwing, the free-response domain has also proved successful for parapsychologists. For example, Milton (1997a) conducted a meta-analysis of studies on participants who were in a normal waking state of consciousness during a freeresponse task. Her period of analysis was 1964 -1992 . For a database of 75 studies, Milton found a weak but significant effect.
Skeptics have disputed claims for paranormal phenomena (see Alcock, 1981; Blackmore, 1985; Hansel, 1966 Hansel, , 1980 Hyman, 1989) . Alcock (1981) insisted that parapsychologists must "demonstrate the existence of psi independently of . . . non-chance results" (p. 147). Blackmore (1985) , once a parapsychologist herself, was disturbed that she found so little evidence in her PhD thesis for the paranormal, but as Berger (1989) pointed out, "'Flaws' were invoked [by Blackmore] to dismiss significant results while other flaws were ignored when studies produced nonsignificant results" (p. 123). Berger also claimed that Blackmore "misreport[ed]" and "incorrectly reported" experimental details and statistical results that supported the psi hypothesis in Blackmore's studies. Hansel (1966 Hansel ( , 1980 argued that because psi cannot be convincingly and consistently demonstrated (or better, induced on demand) in the laboratory, it does not exist. He even argued that if fraud is possible in a psi experiment, it is reasonable to assume that fraud did take place. Hyman (1989) has admitted that he attempts to "justify withholding any attention to the claims for the paranormal on the part of orthodox science" (p. 206). However, in regard to the success of free-response studies, he has acknowledged that the critics have not "demonstrated a plausible alternative" that explains the significant effects (p. 157). Akers (1984) drew attention to "explanations" that skeptics use to justify their doubt regarding the existence of psi, such as randomization failure, sensory leakage, cheating, and procedural errors. His point is that even the seemingly best parapsychological studies have flaws that preclude their findings as evidence of paranormal effects. However, that was over two decades ago, before standards were markedly improved. What might have been true then has little bearing today.
Added to the skeptic's list of explanations for the psi communication anomaly are "delusion, . . . coincidence, [and] unconscious inference" (Stokes, 1987, p. 84) . Because these claims abound, it remains for the parapsychologist not only to eliminate all possibility of these explanations but also to design experiments that furnish repeatable evidence of psi. One such design may be the ganzfeld.
The Origins of the Ganzfeld
The most renowned and certainly the most controversial domain in parapsychology is a procedure for testing telepathy in a form of free-response condition known as Ganzfeld (German for "total field"). The ganzfeld is a "special type of environment (or the technique for producing it) consisting of homogenous [sic] , unpatterned sensory stimulation" to the eyes and ears of the participant, who is usually in "a state of bodily comfort" (Thalbourne, 2003, p. 45) . Traditionally, the ganzfeld is a procedure whereby an agent in one room is required to "psychically communicate" one of four randomly selected picture targets or movie film targets to a perceiver in another room, who is in the ganzfeld condition of homogeneous sensory stimulation. The ganzfeld environment involves setting up an undifferentiated visual field by viewing red light through halved translucent ping-pong balls taped over the perceiver's eyes. Additionally, an analogous auditory field is produced by listening to stereophonic white or pink hissing noise. As in the free-response design, the perceiver's mentation is recorded and accessed later in order to facilitate target identification. At this stage of the session, the perceiver ranks from 1 to 4 the four pictures (one target plus three decoys; Rank 1 ϭ "hit"). This condition follows the noise reduction model, which is considered "psi conducive" because it allegedly reduces irrelevant background noise, leaving mainly the psi signal.
A number of investigators pioneered the ganzfeld technique in the 1970s (W. G. Braud, Wood, & Braud, 1975; Honorton & Harper, 1974; Parker, 1975) . The technique arose from a consideration of the putative psi-conducive (noise reducing) effects of dreaming, hypnosis, relaxation, and meditation. Honorton (1977) , one of the first discussants of "internal attention states" in ESP research, justified the importance of the ganzfeld setting as a crucial component favorable to psi by conceptualizing psi as a weak cognitive signal normally masked by internal cognitive and external "noise." W. G. Braud (2002) saw the ganzfeld state as one that brought about stillness of mind and cognitive quietude in accordance with the model of (mental) noise reduction. Theoretically, by increasing the signal-to-noise ratio (i.e., reducing the noise), the presumed psi information could be better detected. undertook one of the first meta-analyses of the many ganzfeld studies that had accrued by the mid-1980s. Twentyeight studies yielded a collective hit rate of 38%, where 25% would be expected by chance. Honorton noted that of the 28 studies, 23 (82%) had positive z scores. Various flaws in his approach were pointed out by , but ultimately they came to an agreement (Hyman & Honorton, 1986) . Their words from the so-called Joint Communiqué were as follows: "We agree that there is an overall significant effect in this database that cannot reasonably be explained by selective reporting or multiple analysis" (p. 351). They differed only on the "degree to which the effect constitutes evidence for psi" (p. 351).
The Ganzfeld Meta-Analyses
A second major meta-analysis on 11 "autoganzfeld" studies followed . These studies adhered to the guidelines laid down in the Joint Communiqué. The autoganzfeld procedure avoids methodological flaws by using a computercontrolled target randomization, selection, and judging technique. Subsequently, reduced the database to 10 studies by removing one very successful study that was not methodologically comparable to the others. They reported a hit rate of 32.2% for these 10 studies. followed up with the intention of replicating the result of Going one step further, Storm and Ertel (2001) found 11 pre-Communiqué studies not previously meta-analyzed and combined them with database of 28 studies as well as the 40-study database just described. After a minor adjustment (Storm & Ertel, 2002) , a 79-study database was compiled, which had a significant mean ES of 0.138 (Stouffer Z ϭ 5.59, p ϭ 1.14 ϫ 10 Ϫ8 ). In a study with a different agenda, Bem, Palmer, and Broughton (2001) showed that if one considered all the available published articles up to and including 1997 (i.e., Milton and Wiseman's 30 studies, plus 10 new studies), 29 studies that used standard ganzfeld protocols yielded a cumulative hit rate that was significantly above chance (31%), comparable to the results presented by . In contrast, the nine studies that followed nonstandard protocols obtained an overall nonsignificant hit rate of only 24%. The two types of studies were significantly different from each other.
Rationale for the Present Study
Over the course of the last two decades, many parapsychologists abandoned proof-oriented research in favor of process-oriented research, which is the major convention in all scientific fields. This change of focus was necessary to help raise psi beyond its status as a "statistical anomaly" that needed explaining. Thus, whereas Bem et al. (2001) indicated the merits of "continuing to conduct exact replications of the ganzfeld procedure" (p. 215), they also advised process-oriented researchers that they "must be willing to risk replication failure" (p. 215) in their modifications to the standard ganzfeld procedure in order to learn more about paranormal processes.
Because of the great deal of attention that has been lavished on the ganzfeld technique, it may be the case that the ganzfeld design has been partly responsible for the lack of attention paid to other noise reduction studies that do not follow the ganzfeld protocol. These studies, which involve dreaming, hypnosis, relaxation, and meditation, should be meta-analyzed and contrasted with the ganzfeld meta-analyses to assess the real benefit to parapsychology of the ganzfeld design. The ganzfeld may not be the final word on how best to elicit an anomalous communication effect or to reach an understanding as to its nature.
It may also be the case that clues as to the extent and/or optimal strength of the ESP effect could be unearthed through the investigation of individual differences in participants. Statistician Jessica Utts (Utts, 1991) made this claim some years ago: "A promising direction for future process-oriented research is to examine the causes of individual differences in psychic functioning" (p. 377). The evidence that certain psychological factors are psi conducive was clearly illustrated by Honorton (1997) , who claimed that psi could be enhanced with training, or might be better elicited from special personality types or those with specific psiexperiential characteristics. W. G. Braud (2002) also stressed the advantages in using participants who (a) underwent prior psi testing, (b) reported psi experiences, or (c) had personality traits measured in conventional personality inventories. Also, on the basis of past findings, and Morris (1991) have argued that unselected participants somehow do not perform as well as selected participants on psi tasks.
Various personality traits (e.g., extraversion; see Palmer, 1977) and personal characteristics (i.e., psi belief, psi experience; see have been investigated over the decades as psiconducive variables, suggesting that most researchers share the view that these variables play an important role in ESP performance. For example, Bem et al. (2001) advocated for psi testing the selection of participants who have had "previous psi experiences, or practiced a mental discipline such as meditation" (p. 215).
We note that there are a number of reasons why researchers avoid special participants and sample only normal populations (see Discussion). However, if paranormal ability is generally distributed throughout the population, or, conversely, it exists only in subpopulations, skepticism about psi is not justified either way. In the present article we follow a line of inquiry that assesses whether selected participants (i.e., participants who had previous experience in ESP experiments, or were psi believers, or had special psi training, or were longtime practitioners of meditation or relaxation exercises, etc.) have a psi advantage.
Design of the Present Study
The meta-analysis by Bem et al. (2001) included 10 studies (1997) (1998) (1999) , which were not assessed by Storm and Ertel (2001) because the latter's retrospective study was not an update but mainly a critique of the meta-analysis by . Similarly, the meta-analysis by Bem et al. was not comprehensive but merely comparative. A comprehensive, up-to-date meta-analysis of the ganzfeld domain is therefore long overdue. Also, we would argue that the noise reduction model per se tends to be associated exclusively with the ganzfeld, but we find that a considerable number of noise reduction studies (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) using dream ESP, hypnosis, relaxation, and meditation protocols have not been meta-analyzed. Given the alleged importance of noise reduction, we see no reason not to include these marginalized studies in separate meta-analyses. Also, any psi performance differences between selected and unselected participants have not been fully tested, although past research does suggest there are differences. We note here that there is no justification in comparing forced-choice studies in our meta-analysis with free-response studies, as the two designs are incompatible, whereas the three types of study we do compare are all free response. Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed:
1 In fact, Milton and Wiseman were premature in their conclusion. Jessica Utts (personal communication, December 11, 2009 ) used the exact binomial test only on trial counts in Milton and Wiseman's database (N ϭ 1, 198 , hits ϭ 327) and found a significant hit rate of 27% (z ϭ 1.80, p ϭ .036).
Hypothesis 1: Ganzfeld studies yield a stronger mean ES than the nonganzfeld (non-Gz) noise reduction studies, which, in turn, yield a stronger mean ES than the standard free-response studies (i.e., non-Gz, no noise reduction).
Hypothesis 2: Selected participants perform better than unselected participants in all three databases.
Method

Study Retrieval
The following major English-language peer-reviewed journals and other publications were accessed for studies Bem et al. (2001) , 2 but we merged their data set with ours because of the nature of the hypotheses we proposed to test.
To find appropriate research articles online, we conducted exhaustive Internet searches through EBSCOhost of the relevant databases, including PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES, and CINAHL, as well as other relevant databases (i.e., Medline, Web of Science, Lexscien, and InformIT). The following keywords and subject headings were entered in the search: extrasensory perception, ESP, ganzfeld, PK, telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, anomalous cognition, parapsychology, paranormal, and psi . Most of these Internet searches yielded studies already found in the above-listed journals. We adopted the following criteria:
• Only ESP (i.e., telepathy, clairvoyance, and precognitive) studies are to be assessed.
• The number of participants must be in excess of two to avoid the inherent problems such as is typical of case studies.
• Target selection must be randomized by using a random number generator in a computer or otherwise, or a table of random numbers.
• Studies must provide sufficient information (e.g., z scores or number of trials and outcomes) for the authors to calculate the direct hit rates and to apply appropriate statistical tests and calculate ES as z/√n.
Procedure
For each study, we checked the following factors: (a) the criteria adopted for selecting participants, (b) number of participants, (c) number of trials, (d) type of ESP task (clairvoyance, telepathy, or precognition), (e) number of alternatives in the tasks, and (f) total number of hits. Despite Milton's (1997b) finding of a nonsignificant difference between direct hits and sum-of-ranks statistics, we preferred the former measure, as it provides a more "conservative" result (see Honorton, 1985, p. 54) , and it is easier to grasp intuitively.
With these data we derived the proportion of hits. For studies in which z scores were not given, we calculated z scores using the binomial exact probability from the number of hits and trials (http://faculty.vassar.edu/lowry/binomialX.html).
In parapsychological studies each participant is usually given one trial, and each will either get a hit or not get a hit. The "true" hit rate, then, is the probability of success for that trial. We therefore have a true null hypothesis, so the exact binomial test is used because there is an obvious null value associated with that null hypothesis.
Studies were grouped into one of three categories according to the following criteria:
• Category 1: ganzfeld (unselected and selected participants), • Category 2: non-Gz noise reduction (unselected and selected participants), and
• Category 3: standard free response (no ganzfeld or similar noise reduction techniques to alter the normal waking cognitive state through hypnosis, meditation, dreaming, or relaxation).
We classified remote-viewing studies as Category 3 standard freeresponse studies in alignment with Milton's (1997a) claim that remote-viewing studies "are just a subset of a larger group of ESP studies in which free-response methods are used without the participant being in an altered state of consciousness" (p. 280).
Studies were rated for quality by two judges who were graduate students of the second author and were kept blind during the judging phase. That is, following Bem et al. (2001, p. 209) , the judges saw only the method sections from which all identifiers had been deleted, such as article titles, authors' hypotheses, and references to results of other experiments in the article. Other criteria used were adapted from Milton (1997a) . These criteria are
• appropriate randomization (using electronic apparatuses or random tables),
• random target positioning during judgment (i.e., target was randomly placed in the presentation with decoys),
• blind response transcription or impossibility to know the target in advance,
• sensory shielding from sender (agent) and receiver (perceiver),
• target independently checked by a second judge, and • experimenters blind to target identity.
Two judges answered "Yes" or "No" to each of the criteria. The study score is the ratio of points awarded with respect to the items applicable (minimum score is 1/7 ϭ .143; maximum score is 7/7 ϭ 1.00). There were 67 studies in the total pool, but 10 studies (Bem et al., 2001) were already judged. Of the 67 studies we had judged, 17 studies (25%) received a perfect score from at least one judge. However, most criteria (i.e., five or more out of seven) were met in 58 of 67 studies (i.e., 87%). We stress that failure to make explicit declaration does not mean that any given criterion was not incorporated into any given experiment. For example, a minority of studies (approximately 20%) did not declare explicitly "Random target positioning during judgment," but we would assume that meeting this criterion is a prerequisite in any given parapsychological study dating from the time of implementation of the Joint Communiqué (Hyman & Honorton, 1986) . In the last 10 -15 years, we note that most studies used automated procedures to randomize trials, and they used strict controls to avoid any conventional (i.e., normal modality-based) communication between researchers, agents, and perceivers.
Results
Descriptive Statistics and Quality Ratings
Appendix A shows all noise reduction and free-response studies in their respective categories. Sixty-seven studies were reported in 48 articles conducted by 60 experimenters (see References for articles; articles marked with asterisks indicate articles included in the metaanalyses). Sixty-three studies (94%) used a four-choice design (the remaining four studies used a three-, five-, or eight-choice design). For the four-choice designs only, there were 4,442 trials and 1,326 hits, corresponding to a 29.9% hit rate where mean chance expectation (MCE) is equal to 25%. Across the three categories, 31 studies (46.3%) tested telepathy, 26 studies (38.8%) tested clairvoyance, and 10 studies (14.9%) tested precognition. Using a Type III univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) test to control for the imbalance in group sizes, we found no significant difference between the three psi modalities, F(2, 66) ϭ 0.36, p ϭ .697 (two-tailed).
Cronbach's alpha for the two judges' ratings was .79, suggesting a high degree of interrater reliability. Because the correlation between mean quality scores and ES values (the latter are given in Appendix A) was extremely weak and not significant, r s (65) ϭ .08, p ϭ .114 (two-tailed), we claim that ES is not likely to be an artifact of poor experimental design. Category 1 (ganzfeld). This database consisted of 30 ganzfeld studies (47.7% of all studies in our search). For all these 30 studies, paranormal tasks were performed exclusively during the ganzfeld condition. Sixteen studies tested unselected participants only, and 14 studies tested selected participants only (e.g., they believed in the possibility of psi, or had prior spontaneous psi experiences or prior psychic training, or regularly practiced some type of mental discipline).
Z Statistics and Effect Sizes
The full data set of ganzfeld studies (N ϭ 30) yielded mean z ϭ 1.16, mean ES ϭ 0.152, and Stouffer Z ϭ 6.34 ( p ϭ 1.15 ϫ 10 Ϫ10 ; see Table 1 for details). However, the skew of the z-score distribution was not normal, although the skew of the distribution of ES values was normal.
3 One outlier (Case 2 in Appendix A, Category 1) was excluded from further analyses in the present article for having an extremely high z score (Ն5.20).
A homogeneous data set of 29 ganzfeld studies yielded mean z ϭ 1.02 (SD ϭ 1.36; range: Ϫ1.45 to 4.32), mean ES ϭ 0.142 (SD ϭ 0.20; range: Ϫ0.26 to 0.48), and Stouffer Z ϭ 5.48 ( p ϭ 2.13 ϫ 10 Ϫ8 (Roe & Flint, 2007) used an eight-choice design (i.e., one target plus seven decoys), so it could not be included, but all other studies used the four-choice design. For 29 ganzfeld studies (N ϭ 1,498, hits ϭ 483), we found a 32.2% hit rate (binomial z ϭ 6.44, p Ͻ .001).
Although we report a significant Stouffer Z of 5.48 for this database, a more stringent approach to testing a database of studies is provided by Darlington and Hayes (2000) , who regard "mean(z) as the real test statistic" (p. 505). Darlington and Hayes criticized the alternatives: "Stouffer's method and all other well-known probability poolers suffer from three major but avoidable limitations: vulnerability to criticisms of individual studies . . . difficulty in handling the file drawer problem . . . [and] vague conclusions" (pp. 497-498). Darlington and Hayes's "Stouffer-max" test provides a "MeanZ(s,k)" value, which is the "mean of the s highest of k mutually independent values of z" (p. 506), which is then compared with a critical MeanZ. If we take s ϭ 9 (i.e., the nine studies with the significant z scores) and k ϭ 29 (i.e., where k ϭ N ϭ 29), our MeanZ is 2.52. Darlington and Hayes (p. 506 , Table 3 ) give critical MeanZ ϭ 1.51. In other words, the mean z for the ganzfeld database is sufficiently higher than is required by the Stouffer-max test.
With the file-drawer formula given by Rosenthal (1995, p. 189 ; see Appendix C for formula), there would have to be no fewer than 293 unpublished articles in existence with overall nonsignificant results to reduce our significant finding to a chance result. Darlington and Hayes (2000) offered a more conservative and reliable test that determines the number of unpublished nonsignificant studies needed to reduce a database to nonsignificance, but these may also be "highly negative" (or "psi-missing" in the case of parapsychology). Darlington and Hayes claimed that "the [fail-safe N] derived with the binomial method is a lower limit on the number of missing studies that would have to exist to threaten the significance of the pooled p value" (p. 500).
Using Darlington and Hayes's (2000, p. 503 , Table 2 ) tabled data, for nine studies with significant positive outcomes, we find the pooled p less than or equal to .05 if there is a total of up to 95 studies. In other words, we find a "fail-safe N" of up to 95 unpublished studies must exist in total for this category alone, and 86 of these (i.e., 95 minus 9) could all be negative (psi-missing) studies, yet our nine significant studies would still constitute a proof against the null hypothesis. The existence of such a large number of hypothesized unpublished studies (i.e., up to 86) is unlikely.
Category 2 (non-Gz; noise reduction). This database was composed of 16 studies (23.9% of all studies in our search). These 16 studies were classified as noise reduction studies (i.e., they were non-Gz but involved treatment conditions such as dream psi, hypnosis, relaxation, or meditation). Samples were composed en-tirely of either selected participants (n ϭ 10) or unselected participants (n ϭ 6). The full data set yielded mean z ϭ 0.83 (SD ϭ 1.23; range: Ϫ1.55 to 3.06), mean ES ϭ 0.110 (SD ϭ 0.19; range: Ϫ0.22 to 0.47), and Stouffer Z ϭ 3.35 ( p ϭ 2.08 ϫ 10 Ϫ4 ). The database was significant. The distributions for z scores and ES values were both normal. CIs (95%) are as follows: z scores, [0.18, 1.48] ; ES values, [0.010, 0.21] . We note that neither of these 95% CIs includes values of MCE. Of the 16 studies, 11 (68.8%) had positive z scores, with three (18.8%) of the 16 studies independently significant (␣ ϭ .05).
Again following Utts's example, we conducted a binomial exact test on trial counts only. For 16 studies (N ϭ 870, hits ϭ 269), we found a 30.9% hit rate (z ϭ 3.99, p ϭ 3.30 ϫ 10 Ϫ5 ). Once again we applied Darlington and Hayes's (2000) Stouffermax test, given s ϭ 3 and k ϭ 16. Darlington and Hayes (p. 506, Table 3 ) give critical MeanZ ϭ 1.99. Our MeanZ is 2.57, so again the mean z for the non-Gz noise reduction database is sufficiently higher than is required in the Stouffer-max test.
With Rosenthal's (1995) file-drawer formula, there would have to be approximately 49 unpublished and nonsignificant articles in existence to reduce our significant finding to a chance result. It is arguable whether 49 unpublished and nonsignificant studies exist in this category. However, using Darlington and Hayes's (2000, p. 503 , Table 2 ) tabled data, for three significant positive studies, pooled p Յ .05 only if the total number of studies is 16 or less, based on a 16-study database with three significant studies. In other words, 13 studies (i.e., 16 minus 3) might be unpublished, and these are all permitted to be psi-missing studies.
Category 3 (free response). This database consisted of 21 standard free-response studies (28.4% of all studies in our search). These studies did not involve altered states of consciousness or noise reduction techniques. Twelve studies (57.1%) were composed completely of unselected participants, and nine (42.9%) were composed of selected participants. The full data set yielded mean z ϭ 0.47, mean ES ϭ 0.102, and Stouffer Z ϭ 2.17 ( p ϭ 1.50 ϫ 10 Ϫ2 ), which is significant. However, the skews of the z-score and ES distributions were not normal. Seven outliers (Cases 2, 3, 6, 11, 17, 20, and 21 in Appendix A, Category 3) were excluded from further analyses in the present article because ES values and z scores for these studies were extremely high (z Ն 3.50, ES Ն 0.27) or extremely low (ES Յ Ϫ0.29).
A homogeneous data set of 14 free-response studies yielded mean z ϭ Ϫ0.21 (SD ϭ 0.47; range: Ϫ0.94 to 0.65), mean ES ϭ Ϫ0.029 (SD ϭ 0.07; range: Ϫ0.15 to 0.09), and a nonsignificant Stouffer Z of Ϫ2.29 ( p ϭ .989). A binomial exact test on trial counts only (N ϭ 1,872, hits ϭ 455), yielded a 24.3% hit rate (binomial z ϭ Ϫ0.67, p ϭ .749).
Of the 14 studies, only four (28.6%) had positive z scores, and none of these were significant (␣ ϭ .05). CIs (95%) 
Differences Between Databases and Participants
Hypothesis 1. We hypothesized that ganzfeld studies yield a stronger mean ES than the non-Gz noise reduction studies, which, in turn, yield a stronger mean ES than the standard free-response studies. From our analysis above, we can see that the ganzfeld studies produced the strongest mean ES values (mean ES ϭ 0.142), followed by the non-Gz noise reduction studies (mean ES ϭ 0.110), followed by the standard free-response studies (mean ES ϭ Ϫ0.029).
An ANOVA test showed a significant difference in mean ES values, F(2, 53) ϭ 6.08, p ϭ.004 (two-tailed). A post hoc Tukey's test revealed that only Categories 1 and 3 differed significantly from each other (ES mean difference ϭ 0.17, p ϭ .005). Noise reduction studies (ganzfeld) were significantly different from standard free-response studies, which do not feature noise reduction. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was partially supported.
Hypothesis 2. We hypothesized that selected participants perform better than unselected participants in all three databases. For all studies (N ϭ 59), samples were composed entirely of either unselected participants (n ϭ 30) or selected participants (n ϭ 29).
The same univariate ANOVA test above showed that there was no difference on mean ES values between unselected and selected participants, F(1, 53) ϭ 2.25, p ϭ .140 (two-tailed). However, the ANOVA also shows a significant Category ϫ Participant interaction effect, F(2, 53) ϭ 3.50, p ϭ .037 (two-tailed). Figure 1 shows that the effect is attributable to participants in the ganzfeld only. In a separate t test on ganzfeld participants, we found a significant difference between selected (ES ϭ 0.26) and unselected participants (ES ϭ 0.05), t(27) ϭ Ϫ3.44, p ϭ .002 (two-tailed).
Given that we have a significant interaction effect, we tested for two simple effects (unselected participants only and selected participants only) between the three conditions. For unselected participants (n ϭ 30), there was no significant difference between conditions, F(2, 27) ϭ 1.44, p ϭ .255 (two-tailed). However, for selected participants (n ϭ 29), there was a significant difference between conditions, F(2, 26) ϭ 6.83, p ϭ .004 (two-tailed). A post hoc Tukey's test revealed that the difference was between Category 1 (mean ES ϭ 0.26) and Category 3 (mean ES ϭ Ϫ0.03, ES mean difference ϭ 0.29, p ϭ .004). 
ES Comparisons
To ascertain whether the two significant databases (i.e., ganzfeld and non-Gz noise reduction) were the result of extremely positive ES values for a limited pool of experimenters and/or laboratories, we conducted a one-way ANOVA test on the pooled data (N ϭ 45) for those two databases after dividing them into experimenter and laboratory groups. We could not test Experimenter ϫ Laboratory interaction, as we found that a number of experimenters had worked in more than one specific laboratory.
We formed seven mutually exclusive experimenter/laboratory groups with at least two studies in each: "Morris," "Parker," "Parra," "Roe," "Roney-Dougal," "Tressoldi," and "Wezelman." ES values were not significantly different between groups, F(6, 32) ϭ 1.97, p ϭ .315 (two-tailed).
Comparisons With Other Databases
To gauge the importance and relevance of the above results, we contrasted our ganzfeld and free-response databases with two databases compiled from two previous meta-analyses : Storm and Ertel (2001) and Milton (1997a) , respectively.
Ganzfeld studies. When we compared our newly formed 29-study ganzfeld database with Storm and Ertel's (2001) 79-study database (see The Ganzfeld Meta-Analyses section), we found no significant differences on z scores, t(106) ϭ Ϫ1.01, p ϭ .314 (two-tailed), or ES values, t(106) ϭ 0.19, p ϭ .848 (two-tailed). We combined the two databases to form a database of 108 studies: mean z ϭ 0.80 (SD ϭ 1.36), mean ES ϭ 0.142 (SD ϭ 0.27), and Stouffer Z ϭ 8.31 ( p Ͻ 10 Ϫ16 ).
However, this database is heterogeneous. We found three outliers with extremely high ES values (Ն0.70; Cases 7, 16, and 31 as listed in Honorton, 1985, p. 84 , Appendix A) and three that were extremely low (ՅϪ0.46: Case 4 as listed in Honorton, 1985, p. 84 ,  Table A1 ; and Kanthamani, Khilji, & Rustomji-Kerns, 1988 [Series 5b] , and Palmer, 1993, from Milton and . These six were excluded from further analyses in this section.
The homogeneous databases consists of 102 studies: mean z ϭ 0.81 (SD ϭ 1.23; range: Ϫ2.30 to 4.32), mean ES ϭ 0.135 (SD ϭ 0.20; range: Ϫ0.44 to 0.65), and Stouffer Z ϭ 8.13 ( p Ͻ 10 Ϫ16 ). CIs (95%) are as follows: z scores, [0.56, 1.07] ; ES values, [0.10, 0.17] . Note that neither of these includes MCE. Of the 102 studies, 74 (72.5%) had positive z scores. Twenty-seven (26.5%) of the 102 studies are independently significant (␣ Յ .05). Darlington and Hayes's (2000) online table 4 gives critical MeanZ ϭ 1.46, where s ϭ 27. In the Stouffer-max test, the mean z for this large database, at MeanZ ϭ 2.32, is sufficiently higher than is required. With Rosenthal's (1995, p. 189) filedrawer formula, there would have to be approximately 2,414 unpublished and nonsignificant papers in existence to reduce our significant Stouffer Z to chance. Using Darlington and Hayes's (2000) There is a category difference on effect size (ES) between groups-ganzfeld (Gz), nonganzfeld (non-Gz) noise reduction, and standard free response (F-R)-and an interaction effect between category and participant type.
on the 27 significant studies in our database (N ϭ 102). It should be noted that 357 studies (i.e., 384 minus 27) are permitted to be psi-missing studies.
Free-response studies. In her original database of 78 freeresponse studies, Milton (1997a) found an ES of 0.16, mean z of 0.65, and Stouffer Z of 5.72 ( p ϭ 5.40 ϫ 10 Ϫ9 ). In her homogeneous database of 75 studies, having removed "three studies that contributed most to the heterogeneity" (p. 289), Milton found a mean ES of 0.17, mean z of 0.68, and Stouffer Z of 5.85 ( p ϭ 2.46 ϫ 10 Ϫ9 ). For our homogeneous database of 14 free-response studies, we reported above a mean ES of Ϫ0.03, a mean z of Ϫ0.21, and a nonsignificant Stouffer Z of Ϫ2.29 ( p ϭ .989). Thus, Milton's reported ES (0.17) is considerably stronger than the ES reported in the present study. However, using mean z scores and applying Rosenthal and Rubin's (1979) Z diff formula (see Appendix C), we see that the difference is not significant:
It is important to mention an anomaly in Milton's (1997a) database. There are 25 studies (44%) of the 57 studies marked with asterisks in her reference section (pp. 305-312) that are composed largely of designs using transcendental meditation, hypnosis, mental imagery training (or guided imagery), relaxation, and even ganzfeld. We are at a loss in understanding why these studies made it into her meta-analysis when her aim was to assess "free-response ESP studies without altered states of consciousness" (p. 279). Furthermore, two of these studies- Bierman et al. (1984) and Murre, van Dalen, Dias, and Schouten (1988) -are located (properly) in our Appendix B as ganzfeld studies because they are ganzfeld studies. Milton's database is a mixed bag of studies, and it certainly cannot be considered standard free response as we (and arguably Milton) categorize them. On this basis, we contend that nothing can be achieved in making any further comparisons of any databases, old or new, with Milton's database. and were among the first to report decline effects in the ganzfeld domain, but others have drawn attention to the effect (see . Such declines in the ganzfeld could indicate improvements in study quality over the years, which have therefore minimized or eliminated certain flaws. Consequently, psi may be nothing more than an artifact of such flaws. However, decline effects in psi research existed long before the HymanHonorton guidelines were implemented (see Hyman & Honorton, 1986) , so it cannot be assumed that study quality is singlehandedly responsible for declines in the ganzfeld domain. As has pointed out, it should not be assumed that failure to replicate (i.e., decline effects) results from the removal of flaws, just as it is presumptive to assume that past ganzfeld successes were due to the presence of flaws.
Decline Effects Across Time in the Ganzfeld Databases
It is also possible, as Bierman (2001) has indicated, that rather than show declines, ganzfeld databases show so-called rebound effects. Indeed, we argue that ostensible declines could be explained by any number of maturational, historical, and/or environmental effects over the past 34 years, so that the declines themselves may be nothing but artifacts (see ; see also Storm & Ertel, 2001 ). In particular, we note earlier finding of a ganzfeld rebound effect in the form of a flattened U-shaped (polynomial) curve for the period 1972-2001.
We assessed the evidence for an effect size decline in ganzfeld studies over a period of 34 years (1974 to 2008) . Figure 2 shows ES values plotted for 108 ganzfeld studies from five databases: (a) N ϭ 28; period of analysis: 1974 , (b) Storm and Ertel (2001; N ϭ 11; period of analysis: 1982 , (c) N ϭ 10; period of analysis: 1983 , (d) N ϭ 30; period of analysis: 1989 , and (e) our ganzfeld database (N ϭ 29; period of analysis: 1997-2008).
We note that the correlation between year of study and ES is negative and significant for the combined databases (N ϭ 108), r s (106) ϭ Ϫ.21, p ϭ .049 (two-tailed). This result indicates a linear decline in ESs over the 34-year period. However, a rebound effect is also indicated in the form of a significant quadratic polynomial curve: ES ϭ 0.0009 ϫ YEAR 2 ϩ 3.4375 ϫ YEAR ϩ Figure 2 . Scatterplot of ganzfeld studies over a period of 34 years (1974 -2008) . A slight but significant decline (r ϭ Ϫ.21) is indicated ( p ϭ .030), although a significant rebound effect is also indicated in the form of a significant U-shaped curve ( p ϭ .004).
3427.2; R 2 ϭ .12, p ϭ .004 (see Figure 2 ). We tested a dual-line graphic representation of a 95% CI against our polynomial curve and found that our curve sits completely within that CI, so that we can be 95% confident that no effects reported during our 34-year period could be explained by chance. Hyman (2008) relegates to a mere footnote his critique of a similar finding by Bierman (2001) of polynomial curves for two data sets, one of which is the ganzfeld database for the period 1972-2001: In two cases, suggests that after reaching zero, the effect size shows signs of increasing again. However, this is questionable and appears to be an artifact of fitting a polynomial to data where the zero effect size has existed for a while. Under such circumstances, a second-degree polynomial will better fit the data than will a linear regression line. (p. 43, Footnote 1) However, we would argue that Hyman is attempting to predict a pattern in data that is 7 years old and not at all up-to-date at the time of his writing (i.e., 2008), and that much has changed for the ganzfeld since 2001. Bierman's earlier finding clearly anticipates the same effect we find in our more up-to-date analysis.
When we tested for linear declines with the four outlier studies from the database removed, the association between study year and ES is negative, and only approaches significance, r s (102) ϭ Ϫ0.15, p ϭ .126 (two-tailed), and thus is only suggestive of a linear decline. In other words, the decline may be attributable to these four outliers.
When the database is removed as well, the relationship between study year and ES is relatively similar, and still not significant, r s (72) ϭ Ϫ0.14, p ϭ .242 (twotailed). The Milton and Wiseman database is not likely to have contributed to the significant linear decline in the larger database because the slope is about the same, although the nonsignificant p value may be the result of a reduced (i.e., smaller) N. By way of a suggestive proof of this lack of contribution to the decline from the Milton and Wiseman database, when the four outliers are returned, but with the Milton and Wiseman database still excluded, the slope returns to that of the first correlation above for the full database (N ϭ 108) , and approaches significance, r s (76) ϭ Ϫ0.19, p ϭ .098 (two-tailed).
We can assess the decline effect in another way by plotting the mean ES values for each of the five major databases. Figure 3 shows the mean ES values and 95% CIs for the five databases. As can be seen from the figure, it is only one database out of five-that of -for which the population estimate includes a zero ES. The upshot is that the Milton and Wiseman database may not be single-handedly responsible for a linear decline in the combined database of 108 studies, but it is an "outlier" database no less as stated by other parapsychologists (e.g., Bem et al., 2001; Schmeidler & Edge, 1999; Storm & Ertel, 2001) . In contrast, our new database (N ϭ 29), even with its relatively low mean ES, is still outside MCE.
We maintain that some caution is warranted in the interpretation of these results. Nevertheless, our findings indicate that the ganzfeld is one of the most consistent and reliable experimental paradigms in parapsychology.
Discussion
With respect to the hypotheses proposed in the present article, meta-analyses of the three categories-Category 1 (ganzfeld), Category 2 (non-Gz noise reduction), and Category 3 (standard free response)-produced some fairly clear findings. The mean ES value for Category 1 (0.142) was significantly higher than the mean ES for Category 3 (Ϫ0.029). Our tests also showed that there was no performance difference (as measured by ES values) between unselected and selected participants in Categories 2 and 3, although the Category 1 studies (ganzfeld) did yield a significant difference between the two types. This effect is indicated by a significant interaction effect (see Figure 1) . Thus, the ganzfeld seems to be particularly superior to the other two techniques, but only when selected participants are used. Interested psi researchers would do well to note these findings. Even though noise reduction techniques elicit statistical evidence for a communications anomaly, our findings suggest that researchers, if they plan to test selected participants, do so using pure ganzfeld techniques. Yet, even though psi research is nowadays largely process oriented, one still finds (a) recruitment of unselected participants to be about as frequent as recruitment of selected participants, and (b) target identification in nonganzfeld states is about as frequent as target identification in ganzfeld states. Note that for Conditions a and b, the ratio of selected to unselected participants, and ganzfeld to non-Gz studies, is about 1:1 in both cases.
For nearly two decades, ganzfeld pundits (e.g., Morris, 1991) have been advising researchers to (a) select their participants through prior testing and/or training and (b) use a noise reduction technique. This combination still appears to be the best on offer as far as ES yields are concerned. It is probably for that reason that the ganzfeld paradigm has come to dominate the research agenda. However, other (simpler) treatments besides ganzfeld, such as meditation or relaxation, are still a reasonable option. We are aware that researchers' choices are often restricted by practical considerations (e.g., the necessity of recruiting a sufficient number of participants and/or running as many trials as possible, both of which are warranted under the argument from statistical power), so if practical considerations are a serious issue, researchers might be advised to run unselected (i.e., naive) participants through a nonganzfeld noise reduction treatment.
It may also be possible that the evidence obtained in the present study has a strong bearing on the debate about much-discussed declines in ganzfeld research, and the alleged unreliability of psi effects. Although we found evidence of a weak decline across five ganzfeld databases, we add that appearances can be deceiving: There is good evidence that the decline is "in decline," with effects showing an upward trend (see Figures 2 and 3) . Furthermore, after we removed four outlier studies, there was a nonsignificant decline. In addition, with our study, the two significant databases (total N ϭ 45), and only one small nonsignificant database (N ϭ 14), as well as, more generally, only one dubious meta-analysis out of five (see Figure 3) , the two negative assumptions made against ganzfeld research (i.e., that psi effects are in decline and are unreliable) are undermined. Whichever of our analyses is preferred, it appears that 34 years of ganzfeld research has more often than not produced a communications anomaly worth investigating further, as evidenced by the cumulative record: 74 (72.5%; N ϭ 102) had positive z scores, even though only 27 (26.5%) of the 102 studies were independently significant (␣ Յ .05). If 26.5% seems inconclusive or ambiguous, then in spite of, or due to, the statistical evidence, parapsychologists may still have some way to go to convince skeptics.
In summary, it appears that the noise reduction condition tends to produce stronger effects compared with standard free-response studies. This finding addresses a decade-old issue to do with the dubious efficacy of the ganzfeld (see W. G. Braud, 2002; Milton, 1997a) . However, the only statistical evidence that selected participants have an advantage over unselected participants comes from the interaction effect that indicated performance was not the same across conditions, with ganzfeld seeming to be the condition that gave selected participants the advantage. A number of psychological variables, such as confidence, motivation, skill, and the like, may explain the difference.
The decline in ganzfeld effects, alleged to have been ongoing for a period of more than three decades, might possibly be considered a short-term (not a long-term) effect. In point of fact, we have also shown that the decline is an artifact of the presence of outliers. These findings directly address another old issue concerning skepticism that has emerged as a result of the ganzfeld decline, which some critics may have exclusively (and incorrectly) attributed to qualitative improvements and the elimination of flaws in the ganzfeld protocols.
In closing, we emphasize how important it is to free up this line of investigation from unwarranted skepticism and hasty judgments, so that these communication anomalies might be treated and investigated in like manner with other psychological functions. rely on meta-analyses to justify their claim that the evidence for psi is consistent and reliable. They manufacture apparent homogeneity and consistency by eliminating many outliers and combining databases whose combined effect sizes are not significantly differenteven though these combined effect sizes consist of arbitrary and meaningless composites. At best, their study provides a recipe for conducting a replicable extrasensory perception experiment. This recipe includes following a design that employs the standard ganzfeld psi methodology and uses "selected" subjects. An experiment, having adequate power and that meets these criteria, has already been conducted and failed to produce evidence for psi. Parapsychology will achieve scientific acceptability only when it provides a positive theory with evidence based on independently replicable evidence. This is something it has yet to achieve after more than a century of trying.
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Regarding the meta-analysis of Storm, Tressoldi, and Di Risio (2010), I agree with the authors' warning that "some caution is warranted in the interpretation of these results" (p. 479). They follow with the statement that "the ganzfeld is one of the most consistent and reliable experimental paradigms in parapsychology" (p. 479). Perhaps the import of this latter statement should be placed in context. Some major parapsychologists argue that the evidence in their field is inconsistent, unreliable, contradictory, and elusive . If the ganzfeld is, indeed, "one of the most consistent and reliable experimental paradigms in parapsychology," it is unclear whether this should impress the scientific community.
The argument for the consistency and reliability of the ganzfeld experiment relies exclusively on meta-analysis. Meta-analysis is a reasonable way to search for patterns in previously published research. It has serious limitations, however, as a method for confirming hypotheses and for establishing the replicability of experiments. This is especially true for how have used it.
At best, their findings suggest a recipe that might enable parapsychologists to produce that hitherto elusive replicable experiment. This recipe consists of the following steps: (a) use the ganzfeld procedure, (b) make sure that the design and method closely follow the standard ganzfeld experiment, and (c) use "selected" subjects (ones who have been in previous parapsychological experiments and/or believe in psi and/or have had a psychic experience and/or practice one or more mental disciplines). Presumably, the experimenter should also include a sufficient number of trials to guarantee an adequate level of power.
It is this kind of prospective evidence for replicability, not the retrospective kind that emerges from meta-analyses of previous experiments, that is required for scientific acceptability. Indeed, parapsychology's Achilles' heel is its persistent inability to come up with even one example of prospective replicability. Unfortunately for , the outlook for their current solution to this problem is not promising. The reason I say this is that an experiment that meets the authors' requirements has already been conducted and failed.
Autoganzfeld II
The series of experiments known as the "autoganzfeld" database were conducted in a single laboratory beginning in 1983 and terminating in 1989. These included eight ganzfeld experiments (three pilot and five formal) that were praised by parapsychologists and others for having overcome the methodological weaknesses of the original ganzfeld database and for their use of state-of-the-art procedures . The pooled findings based on 330 sessions yielded a hit rate of 32% (as compared with the chance level of 25%), which was statistically significant. Because the combined hit rate for 28 studies from the original ganzfeld database was 35%, the similarities of these two hit rates encouraged parapsychologists to hail the autoganzfeld experiments as a successful replication of the original ganzfeld series.
I have more to say about these experiments later. Here I want to alert the reader to the fact that the autoganzfeld experiments used two types of targets: static and dynamic. The static targets were still pictures similar to those used in the original ganzfeld database. The dynamic targets were brief video clips with a sound track. The trials using static targets produced a hit rate consistent with chance (approximately 26%). Indeed, the hit rate for the static targets was significantly lower than the hit rate for the original ganzfeld database in which only static targets were used. The significant hit rate obtained in the autoganzfeld experiments was due entirely to the hit rate of 37% for the dynamic targets.
In 1993 initiated "an attempted replication" of the autoganzfeld research. During a period of 2.5 years, they completed 209 trials, 151 of which they considered to be the "formal" component of their replication attempt. Autoganzfeld II, as the authors designated their replication attempt, used the same design, software, and equipment that was used in Autoganzfeld I. Not only was it a direct attempt to replicate the allegedly successful original series, but it remarkably fulfills the very recipe that have proposed.
Autoganzfeld II meets the criteria that imply will achieve the desired outcome. It is a ganzfeld experiment that is clearly in line with the standard ganzfeld procedure. Although the participants did not have prior experience in parapsychology experiments, 91% reported having had psychic experiences, and 70% practiced a mental discipline. Just as important, this replication attempt had adequate power. If one focuses on the dynamic targets, which had a hit rate of 37%, and accounted for all the significant hitting in the Autoganzfeld I, the power was 94% for the formal sample of 151 trials and over 98% for the total sample of 209 trials.
For the formal trials, the hit rate was 26.5%, and for the total of 209 trials, the hit rate was 25.8% (chance ϭ 25%). The authors correctly conclude that this attempted replication failed. Even the secondary analyses failed to support various other findingspersonality correlates, role of selected participants, etc.-that had been reported for the Autoganzfeld I experiments. At the same time Broughton and Alexander were running the Autoganzfeld II trials, was conducting a series of ganzfeld experiments that were also aimed at replicating Autoganzfeld I. These experiments also failed to replicate the original autoganzfeld results. emphasize the consistency of the ganzfeld databases. This position contrasts with that of some of their parapsychological colleagues, who are troubled by the pervasive inconsistencies in parapsychological data including the ganzfeld studies . These inconsistencies go beyond the decline effect over time. supplied a comprehensive overview of the many ways in which the evidence for psi displays its frustratingly "capricious" nature. He covered such categories as psi missing and negative reliability, the shift from intended effects to unintended secondary effects, erosion of evidence and decline effects over time, the inverse correlation of effect size with improved methodology, and the lack of practical applications of psi.
Persistent Inconsistencies
The reliance of on meta-analysis masks rather than uncovers the actual situation. The consistency they find and report is a manufactured one. They create "homogeneous" databases by removing outliers. This practice makes the remaining effect sizes less variable but does not change the fact that the original populations of experiments are heterogeneous. They compound this problem by justifying the combination of databases whenever a statistical test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no difference among the effect sizes. Every introductory course in statistics emphasizes that failure to reject the null hypothesis is not the same as proving the null hypothesis.
Some of the joining of databases borders on incoherence. After making a point that the Milton-Wiseman database is an outlier with respect to other ganzfeld databases, do not hesitate to combine that database with their own. They fit a quadratic curve to the plot of the effect sizes for ganzfeld experiments over time to support the claim of a "rebound effect." A rebound effect implies that the effect sizes of the most recent studies are significantly higher than those of the immediately preceding studies. Again, this does not stop them from combining all these studies into one homogeneous database. They then compound this mistake by using the exact binomial to calculate a combined effect size and test it for significance.
One should remember that an effect size is simply a standardized discrepancy between an observed outcome and an outcome expected by chance. The combining of effect sizes from different studies makes sense only if one can show that the separate effect sizes are conceptually coherent-that they all can be attributed to the same underlying cause. For this purpose, the investigator must have a theory and a solid empirical rationale for assuming that the combined effect sizes truly belong to the same category. Even parapsychologists admit that they have no positive theory for deciding which departures from chance, if any, reflect the presence of a single entity called psi.
One way to judge whether a database is internally consistent is to see whether the effect sizes are homogeneous or heterogeneous. However, this makes sense only if it has already been determined that the separate effect sizes are qualitatively coherent, not just quantitatively so. It takes time and effortful scrutiny of the individual studies to make such a judgment. I have done this for both the original ganzfeld database and for the original autoganzfeld database (Hyman, , 1994 . For these databases, I can confidently state that they clearly do not form coherent collections. For the remaining and more recent studies, there is good reason to suspect that they differ qualitatively from the earlier databases. I provide some examples below.
Heterogeneity of the Original Ganzfeld Database
The original ganzfeld database was contained in a set of documents that Honorton supplied to me in 1982. By his count, this database consisted of 42 ganzfeld experiments described in 34 reports. As far as he could tell, these reports-some published and some unpublished-consisted of all the ganzfeld experiments that had been done at the time I had requested his help in locating them. I had accepted an assignment to do a critical evaluation of parapsychological research. However, the accumulation of experiments on psi by that time was far too large to be scrutinized in a reasonable amount of time. I decided to restrict my evaluation to the complete set of experiments that represented the most promising line of parapsychological research at that time. Honorton and the other parapsychologists agreed that this would be the ganzfeld.
In my critique of the ganzfeld experiments, I evaluated the quality of all 42 experiments. However, I conducted a metaanalysis using 36 of the 42 experiments . Six studies were excluded because they used ratings rather than the number of hits as outcome measures. If one includes these six by measuring effect size based on a z score divided by the square root of trials in the manner of , the overall effect size for the database becomes notably smaller. In his rebuttal to my critique, used only those studies that used direct hits based on four targets. His reduced database of 28 experiments has subsequently been identified with the "original" ganzfeld database. The inconsistency in the database that I discuss here exists regardless of which of the original databases one usesHonorton's set of 28, Hyman's meta-analytical sample of 36, or the full set of 42.
The surprising number of problems and flaws in the original database are well documented in my critique . Here I discuss just the matter of experimenter effects. I reported an analysis of variance that obtained a significant outcome for effect size due to individual experimenters. The pooled effect size across all the investigators translated into a direct hit rate of 35% (chance level ϭ 25%). Almost all the above-chance hitting came from four experimenters who contributed half the studies to this database. The composite effect size for these four investigators translated into a direct hit rate of 44%. The contributions from the remaining experimenters, which composed the remaining 50% of the trials in the database, yielded a composite hit rate of 26%.
Clearly, this database consists of two populations: one from four experimenters who consistently contributed experiments with above-chance results and the other from several other experimenters who consistently obtained results consistent with chance. The composite hit rate for the entire database is an arbitrary mixture of at least two sources. Its average size is arbitrary. If a larger proportion of the studies had been contributed by the "successful" experimenters, the average of the composite could have been much higher. It could have been much lower if the "unsuccessful" experimenters had provided a larger proportion.
Autoganzfeld as a Failed Replication of the Original Ganzfeld Database
I have already mentioned that the combined hit rate for the original autoganzfeld experiments consisted of the nonsignificant hit rate for static targets and the significant hit rate for dynamic targets. Surprisingly, parapsychologists still treat the autoganzfeld experiments as a successful replication of the original ganzfeld experiments. In fact, the trials in the autoganzfeld series with static targets, the type of still images used in the original database, were not only consistent with chance but also significantly different from the hit rate in the original series. This situation represents a failure to replicate the findings in the original database. The parapsychologists, with their trust in meta-analysis, apparently were persuaded that the hit rate of 35% in the original series was sufficiently similar to the hit rate of 32% in the autoganzfeld to justify declaring the outcomes equivalent. These procedures demonstrate that the blind use of meta-analysis can convince some parapsychologists that two arbitrary and conceptually meaningless composites reflect the same underlying reality just because they have approximately the same quantitative size.
Autoganzfeld II as a Failed Replication of Both the Original and the Autoganzfeld Series
I used the Autoganzfeld II experiment as an example of one that, according to , meets the criteria for a reliable, independently replicable study. Despite having adequate power, the results not only failed to replicate the key findings of the original autoganzfeld series but also were inconsistent with the original ganzfeld database.
Recent Ganzfeld Databases Inconsistent With the Preceding Databases
One peculiarity that was consistent across the early ganzfeld databases was the finding of a negative correlation between the z score and the square root of the number of trials across experiments . This is a peculiar finding because the statistical theory underlying hypothesis testing depends upon the assumption that the z scores are positively correlated with the square root of the number of trials (which has interesting implications for issues of power that I do not discuss here).
As reported in an earlier version of their article, the correlation between the z scores and the number of trials in their most recent database is positive. This suggests another way in which the most recent ganzfeld databases may qualitatively differ from the earlier ones. I do not have sufficient space to describe other reasons for questioning the authors' combining of databases and conducting tests of significance on composite effect sizes that are of dubious provenance. However, the examples I have provided should suffice to make the point.
Use of Meta-Analysis to Support Replicability of Psi
Evidence Is Fallacious conclude their article as follows: "We emphasize how important it is to free up this line of investigation from unwarranted skepticism and hasty judgments, so that these communication anomalies might be treated and investigated in like manner with other psychological functions" (p. 480). This statement begs the question. It assumes that "communication anomalies" have been demonstrated. The statement also implies that parapsychological claims are dismissed for reasons other than the adequacy of their evidence.
Since the beginnings of modern science, scientists have been confronted with many claims of anomalies. Typically, these claimed anomalies were presented as clearly defined discrepancies from theoretical baselines within a given discipline. For each such claim, the scientific community reacted with caution. The first inclination was to look for flaws in the evidence and the arguments used to support the discrepancy. If the claim passed this test, the next step was to demand independently replicable evidence to justify the claim (as well as some coherent explanatory support).
For some claims, such as those for meteorites, general relativity, quantum mechanics, and the planet Neptune, the claims passed these tests, and the scientific theories were adjusted or revised to accommodate the claimed anomaly. For many more claims, such as those for N-rays, polywater, mitogenetic radiation, and Martian canals, the evidence could not be independently replicated, and the claimed anomalies were rejected. This conservative approach to claims of an anomaly has served the scientific community well. Philosophers and historians of science, among others, often credit this conservative approach for the huge success of modern science (Hyman, 1964) .
If the scientific community has a bias against parapsychology's claim of a communications anomaly, this is as it should be. Parapsychology, during its more than a century of existence, shares many similarities with the many other failed claims for a scientific anomaly. A key similarity is its failure to provide independent, replicable evidence. Another similarity is its defense that psi is an inherently elusive phenomenon and that only certain conditions and individuals have the ability to produce or observe the evidence.
A puzzling difference between parapsychological claims and other failed claims of anomaly is that despite over a century of failing to come up with even one replicable experiment, parapsychological claims are still with us, whereas the others occupy science's discard pile. One reason for this state of affairs is that the other failed claims all originated within a given scientific program and the implications of the claimed anomaly were clearly apparent within that program. Parapsychological claims, on the other hand, originate outside existing scientific programs. They do not arise as a clearly delineated discrepancy from a specific hypothesis within a given scientific domain. Rather, the claim for a communications anomaly is based on an amorphous discrepancy from a generic statistical baseline. As such, its specific implications, if true, for a given scientific discipline are unclear.
In relying on their meta-analyses to justify their claim for a communications anomaly, argue that the results indicate that the ganzfeld experiments, especially those that follow their recipe, are coherent and consistent. They do not actually go so far as their colleagues Utts and Radin, who use meta-analysis to justify their claim that the ganzfeld experiment, along with other parapsychological experiments, is replicable. Utts (1995) has written, "Using the standards applied to any other area of science, it is concluded that psychic functioning has been well established" (p. 289). has put the claim more forcefully: "We are forced to conclude that when psi research is judged by the same standards as any other scientific discipline, then the results are as consistent as those observed in the hardest of the hard sciences!" (p. 58, emphasis in the original).
This reliance on meta-analysis as the sole basis for justifying the claim that an anomaly exists and that the evidence for it is consistent and replicable is fallacious. It distorts what scientists mean by confirmatory evidence. It confuses retrospective sanctification with prospective replicability. An example from one of the failed claims of anomaly may be instructive. The French physicist René Blondlot announced his discovery of N-rays early in the 20th century (Stradling, 1907) . During the period from 1903 through 1907, 325 reports on N-rays appeared in scientific journals. Of these, approximately 180 were accounts of experimental investigations into N-rays. During the first year and a half after Blondlot's announcement, 128 of the N-ray experiments were successful, and around 37 failed to find evidence for N-rays. It was not until 1905 that the number of unsuccessful experiments began to outnumber the successful ones. By 1907, it had become clear that almost no one could successfully replicate the original N-ray findings.
The claim for N-rays was rejected because the results were inconsistent and could not be reliably replicated. However, by the time that N-rays were clearly rejected, the accumulated database consisted of 180 successful and 100 unsuccessful experiments supporting the existence of N-rays. If someone decided to use a meta-analysis on this database, the combined effect size would have undoubtedly been significant. Of course, the scientific community would not consider such an outcome as evidence for the replicability of N-rays, nor should one accept that a significant effect size in a parapsychological database is evidence that the evidence is replicable. Required, of course, are demonstrations that the claimed evidence can be prospectively obtained by independent investigators, given appropriately designed experiments with adequate power.
Conclusions
My first attempt to critique parapsychological research (Hyman, 1957 ) motivated me to scrutinize actual experimental reports rather than general summaries. Such scrutiny takes time and effort. I was surprised to discover that parapsychologists were more statistically and methodologically sophisticated than critics had portrayed them. However, I also found disturbing examples of methodological oversights along with otherwise admirable controls. Perhaps the most puzzling experience came from my hours devoted to a detailed inspection of the experiments in the original ganzfeld database . Even today I find it difficult to understand how parapsychologists could have tolerated so many obvious flaws in what was claimed to be their most successful database. I found the autoganzfeld experiments greatly improved in methodology over the original ganzfeld experiments. On the other hand, my careful analysis of the actual data from these experiments uncovered peculiar patterns that could possibly point to some subtle biases (Hyman, 1994) .
To me the most bothersome aspect of parapsychological research during the century or so of its existence is its persistent inconsistency. During the past 50 years, I have become acquainted with many parapsychologists who agreed with my assessment. They were understandably distressed by this state of affairs. I have already referred to some contemporary parapsychologists who acknowledge the elusiveness and inconsistency of parapsychological evidence . provides an account of one of the kinds of inconsistencies that frustrate parapsychologists:
A rather spectacular example of the decline in effect size happened when in 1995 two independent groups, one from Durham, NC, the other from Amsterdam, published the data of the first part of their respective ganzfeld series (Broughton & Alexander, 1995; . The over-all hit rates were: 33% (N ϭ 100) and 38.2% (N ϭ 76). One year later the series were finished with the following astonishing figures for the second part: Durham 13.7% (N ϭ 51) and Amsterdam 15.6% (N ϭ 32) ; . Thus the results of the first and second part of both series differed significantly between the years while within the same year the groups replicated each other as if some outside factor in 1996 had influenced both groups to go from hitting into missing. . . . (p. 274) For parapsychologists who believe in psi, such inconsistencies must be discouraging, indeed. Their typical remedy is to propose that such inconsistencies are an inherent property of psi. This not only begs the question but makes it impossible to prove the existence of psi within the framework of science. Science cannot investigate a phenomenon that is inherently unpredictable and evasive.
In direct opposition to those parapsychologists who emphasize the elusive and inconsistent nature of their evidence, those such as believe that the evidence is consistent and can meet accepted scientific criteria, if only the scientific community can set aside its prejudices and fairly examine the data. I think it is relevant that the parapsychologists of this second group rely on meta-analysis for their arguments.
Meta-analysis can mask the underlying contradictions of the original experiments by providing a buffer between the original data and the investigators. Once the effect sizes are abstracted from the original data, the only information that is preserved is a dimensionless index of size. Such indices can display heterogeneity only as variations in effect sizes. When the appropriate statistics indicate that a collection of effect sizes is heterogeneous, the authors can make databases homogeneous by simply removing a sufficient number of the more extreme cases. They can further create consistency by combining databases from different sources whenever the combined effect sizes do not differ significantly. All these manipulations of the data, including finding significant effect sizes, can be done without any reference to the bothersome inconsistencies that abound within the actual studies.
In the final analysis, parapsychology will succeed in its quest to demonstrate its communications anomaly only when it can generate specific hypotheses that predict patterns of outcomes that are consistent, lawful, and independently replicable by parapsychologists and others. So far, careful assessment of the parapsychological literature does not justify optimism on this matter. In our article , we claimed that the ganzfeld experimental design has proved to be consistent and reliable. However, Hyman (2010) argues that the overall evidence for psi is, in fact, contradictory and elusive. We present a case for psi research that undermines Hyman's argument. First, we give examples from parapsychologists who do not outrightly dismiss psi, despite appearances, but actually support it. Second, we claim that Hyman does not tell the full story about the ganzfeld meta-analytic findings and thus presents a one-sided account. Third, we argue that our meta-analysis has followed standard procedures, that we have not broken any rules but have found a communications anomaly, often referred to as psi. Though we may be in agreement that the evidence is largely statistical, the evidence suggests that concealed targets are actually identified rather than guessed. We argue that further research is necessary.
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On the Words Used to Describe Evidence for Psi
In our article , we stated that "the ganzfeld is one of the most consistent and reliable experimental paradigms in parapsychology" (p. 479). We believe that the empirical evidence supports our claim, but in response to our statement, Hyman (2010) makes a case from an apparently broader "context" and alleges that various authors (i.e., ) have conversely claimed that the evidence for psi is "inconsistent, unreliable, contradictory, and elusive" (p. 486). We point out that we were not making claims about psi but were commenting on an experimental design. On that note, Hyman states it is "unclear" whether our claims for the ganzfeld "should impress the scientific community" (Hyman, 2010, p. 486 ), but we are on record for saying that "parapsychologists may still have some way to go to convince skeptics" (Storm et al., 2010, p. 480 ). Although we may agree with Hyman to some degree about how the ganzfeld may be perceived, we wish to critique Hyman's more general allegation against the evidence for psi because we believe it is not entirely warranted, especially given the literature he cites.
We disagree with Hyman's (2010) approach of citing an arbitrarily representative group of four or five parapsychologists and, in some cases, putting words in their mouths. For example, Bierman (2001) used only one of the four above-mentioned adjectives (i.e., elusive) and did so only in the context of an explanation by of the "elusive character of laboratory experiments" (Lucadou, 2001, p. 10) , not psi per se. More importantly, Bierman refers to the "cumulating evidence" of psi and adds that the "evidence is very strong" (p. 269). Furthermore, Lucadou states that "individual researchers (including me) are personally convinced that psi exists" (p. 7). Importantly, neither Bierman nor Lucadou regard psi as the result of "statistical flukes or errors" (Bierman, 2001, p. 269) or "flaws or artifacts" (Lucadou, 2001, p. 15) .
Of course, some researchers, including , might feel the aforementioned adjectives are appropriate, but is effectively impartial: "psi is sometimes impressive and reliable" (p. 53). And are more than open-minded:
A huge body of reliable data is now available. Meta-analytic evaluation of these sources remains difficult for a number of reasons (see Radin & Nelson, 1989; and Ehm, 2003) , but is indicative of widespread and recurrent anomalous effects which must not be ignored, but are yet to be explained. (p. 261) We would add additional quotes. As Hyman notes, Dean Radin (a distinguished longtime contributor to the parapsychological debate) describes psi effects as "consistent" (Radin, 1997, p. 58 , emphasis in the original; cited in Hyman, 2010, p. 489) . And , in their meta-analysis of precognition forced-choice experiments, refer to "robust" and highly significant results across a time span of more than 50 years without evidence of a decline. This kind of exchange could go on ad infinitum, but little progress would be made.
On Meta-Analysis Hyman (2010) undermines the objectives and gains made from meta-analysis, referring to it as having "serious limitations . . . as a method for confirming hypotheses and for establishing the replicability of experiments" (p. 486). In fact, meta-analyses in all scientific fields are conducted to clarify findings in a collection of related studies for which there may be some ambiguity at the unit level of the individual study. Starting with a research hypothesis (i.e., that there is an effect), investigators seek to confirm (i.e., find support) for that hypothesis. From these findings, useful policies may be subsequently adopted (see, e.g., Cook et al., 1992; Glass, McGaw, & Smith, 1981) . Hyman (2010) argues that it is "prospective evidence for replicability, not the retrospective kind that emerges from metaanalyses of previous experiments, that is required for scientific acceptability" (p. 486). We find that Hyman ironically makes too big a case for the ganzfeld, and describes the upshot of our article as a bid for a standard ganzfeld recipe that parapsychologists might follow. But we never intended to prescribe or schematize the perfect psi experiment because we also argued that nonganzfeld "noise reduction techniques elicit statistical evidence for a communications anomaly" on par with the ganzfeld (Storm et al., 2010, p. 480) . Nevertheless, Hyman appeals to the Autoganzfeld II study by , where the aforementioned ganzfeld "recipe" had "failed" because the hit rate was an overall 25.8% for 209 trials. In fact, the "emotionally close series" produced a significant hit rate of 37.3%, and the "general series" produced a comparable hit rate of 37.5%.
Before Hyman (2010) discusses the Autoganzfeld II study, he refers to the Autoganzfeld I study, contending that the "significant hit rate obtained in the autoganzfeld [I] experiments was due entirely to the hit rate of 37% for the dynamic targets" (pp. 486 -487). We note, however, that actually "predicted" (p. 12) a significantly higher hit rate for dynamic targets (a significant 37%) as "suggested by the earlier ] meta-analysis" (p. 12)-a proof that metaanalysis can provide "prospective evidence for replicability" (Hyman, 2010, p. 486) . It must also be remembered that the nonsignificant 27% for the "static target" study set is still above mean chance expectation, and every data set that is above chance makes a contribution to the overall ganzfeld trend. As for participant type, Bem and Honorton noted that "88% of the participants reported personal experiences suggestive of psi, and 80% had some training in meditation or other . . . mental disciplines" (p. 13). We note that the samples in study were mostly too small for them to yield significant correlations, but those participants who reported "psi experiences" produced a higher mean hit rate (26.8%) than those who did not (23.1%), although the effect was not in the direction hypothesized for those who practiced "mental disciplines" (p. 219).
Hyman (2010) also mentions failed attempt at ganzfeld replication, but out of four studies conducted by Bierman, one was significant and another approached significance (see . And because Hyman makes an issue of replication, why does he not mention four other significant replications conducted during that relevant decade (Dalton, 1994; Kanthamani & Broughton, 1994, Study 4; Morris, Cunningham, McAlpine, & Taylor, 1993, Study I; Morris, Dalton, Delanoy, & Watt, 1995) ?
The issue of concern here is whether one or two isolated studies provide sufficient evidence against an experimental design. We know that psi effects are generally weak, as are many psychological effects, so we do not expect replication on demand in any given study. Again, that is why we conduct meta-analyses. If the meta-analyses tell us anything, it is that nothing is absolute.
On the Capricious Nature of Psi
Hyman itemizes "problems" that has identified as indicating the "capricious" nature of psi, including "psi missing and negative reliability, the shift from intended effects to unintended secondary effects, erosion of evidence and decline effects over time, the inverse correlation of effect size with improved methodology, and the lack of practical applications of psi" (Hyman, 2010, p. 487) . For the ganzfeld, we have already argued in our article that the "erosion of evidence," "negative reliability," and "the inverse correlation of effect size with improved methodology" are in dispute. The other effects ("psi missing" and "secondary effects") have been well documented and independently tested by researchers. For example, psi missing can be taken as a mirror effect more commonly produced by nonbelievers, just as psi hitting is more common among believers .
As for practical applications of psi, this is largely unexplored territory (especially in the laboratory), but for many years we have been aware of psychic individuals who are, or have been, gainfully employed in psi practice and produce useful or profitable results (see Schouten, 1993; Schwartz, 1983 Schwartz, , 2000 Schwartz, , 2005 . In his comprehensive review, Schouten (1993) found that "psychics might occasionally have impressions which are difficult to explain and which could be considered paranormal" (p. 387), also commenting that "complementary medicine deserves a place in the health care system" (p. 399). Schwartz (1983 Schwartz ( , 2000 Schwartz ( , 2005 has gone to great lengths to demonstrate the uses of psi in archaeology and anthropology, and this approach extends to crime solving and detection-areas that have already seen applications (Schouten, 1994) .
Claiming that our meta-analysis "masks rather than uncovers the actual situation" (p. 487), Hyman (2010) alleges that we have "manufactured" consistency. We state that removing outliers to create homogeneous databases and/or to merge databases is standard practice in meta-analysis. We were transparent in our procedures and findings, applied standard rules, and did not invent any untoward techniques (see, e.g., Rosenthal, 1984) . If the "original populations of experiments are heterogeneous" (Hyman, 2010, p. 487) , then so be it-surely it is a better practice to err on the side of caution than mistakenly inflate or deflate the size of an effect. As for statistical testing of hypotheses, it is a truism that statistical proof of the null is never possible.
On whether the database is an "outlier," we meant it to be counted as an exception because our population estimates of z score and effect size values included zero for that database, and only that database. Even so, we put the psi hypothesis severely to test in finding that such a low-yield database (effect size ϭ .013) could still be legitimately merged with other databases without adversely affecting the overall significance of increasingly larger databases.
We also stress that Hyman's (2010) claim is simply untrue that a "rebound effect implies that the effect sizes of the most recent studies are significantly [emphasis added] higher than those of the immediately preceding studies" (p. 487). Hyman's use of the word "significantly" suggests that heterogeneous databases were combined, which is not the case. The combined 108 studies is the result of consistently finding nonsignificant differences between databases.
Finally, "using the exact binomial to calculate a combined effect size and test it for significance" (Hyman, 2010, p. 487 ) is entirely acceptable. As we reported in our article (Storm et al., 2010, p. 473) , statistician Jessica Utts (personal communication, December 11, 2009 ) endorsed and used the exact binomial test on trial counts in the database and found a significant hit rate of 27%. We had used standard meta-analytic procedures, and there was no "mistake" (Hyman, 2010, p. 487) in our actions. On the contrary, we presented a truer picture of the variance in effects by including rather than excluding the Milton and Wiseman database on the basis of statistical test results. Hyman (2010) states that "combining of effect sizes from different studies makes sense only if one can show that the separate effect sizes are conceptually coherent-that they all can be attributed to the same underlying cause," adding that "parapsychologists admit that they have no positive theory for deciding which departures from chance, if any, reflect the presence of a single entity called psi" (p. 487). We acknowledge that "no positive theory" yet exists to explain psi, but our article was neither a theoretical exercise nor a comparison of psi theories (for which there are many; see . We took a purely empirical approach by presenting an update. We believe that we confirmed that psi effects can be found in a larger data set where any given single study on its own may be inconclusive. Our action is no less inappropriate than Galileo's demonstration of gravitational effects in preNewtonian times without it being necessary for Galileo to have a "positive theory" that describes why such effects should exist. Hyman (2010) refers to the "surprising number of problems and flaws" (p. 488) in database, as documented in his critique, but the issues he raised have been disputed by numerous respondents including Harris and Rosenthal (1988) , , and Saunders (1985) . (Space does not permit elaboration here.) On one particular issue, Hyman argues that the same database by Honorton was heterogeneous, comprising a mixture of studies from two populations: (a) "four experimenters who consistently contributed experiments with abovechance results [44%]" and (b) "several other experimenters who consistently obtained results consistent with chance [26%]" (p. 488). A worthy point is demonstrated here, but to put it into perspective, it contrasts with our finding that significant experimenter/laboratory differences were not found (see Storm et al., 2010, p. 477) . This finding is a replication (see ). Hyman (2010) argues that our claim for "communication anomalies" only "begs the question" (p. 488) because the nature of the anomaly has not been specified. We agree that the effect is a statistical anomaly first and foremost, but there is clearly some degree of unexplained identification of targets above chance expectation, which surely gives cause for further investigation. Science needs imaginative researchers who can find useful applications for this effect. The alternative is to ignore the effects and hope, as many scientists do, that these alleged effects will go away as people wise up and the small community of parapsychologists loses interest, so that the issue will never be resolved.
On Communication Anomalies
It is difficult to discern what Hyman (2010) intends for parapsychology. We can only say that a true and proper attitude to psi phenomena is to take them seriously until proven otherwise, which surely requires a consistent and sustained effort. Certainly, given the little time devoted to parapsychology compared with other disciplines, psychical research is still young. We thus believe that parapsychology is unfairly dismissed by skeptics who state that "despite over a century of failing to come up with even one replicable experiment, parapsychological claims are still with us" (Hyman, 2010, p. 489) . Across this century of work, limited resources were available to the field, and replications have been discounted. Proffering a few studies failing to reveal replication does not stand up against the overall findings from the greater weight of many dozens of studies in the meta-analyses. Independent of the meta-analyses, repeatable psi effects in single studies have been found, even by skeptics like Stanley Jeffers (Freedman, Jeffers, Saeger, Binns, & Black, 2003) .
Hyman (2010) states that we believe "parapsychological claims are dismissed for reasons other than the adequacy of their evidence" (p. 488); in large part, this is true. Mainstream academia cannot see a place for psi. We argue that their interest would quickly change if we could furnish them with what they deem to be evidence, but because many academics have "already decided the issue," to use Hansen's (1991, p. 202) words, minds are closed. It is not only the spirit of academic freedom that is violated or at least curbed but, more broadly, the scientific enterprise.
Hyman (2010) closes by stating the following: "Required, of course, are demonstrations that the claimed evidence can be prospectively obtained by independent investigators, given appropriately designed experiments with adequate power" (p. 489). We remind readers that we tested laboratories and investigators and found that no single experimenter or laboratory group produced effect sizes significantly different from any other. As noted above, this finding is a replication. Hyman (2010) is convinced of parapsychology's "persistent inconsistency" (p. 489), but we maintain that psi is anything but inconsistent. We argue that the meta-analytic results do count for something. It is of paramount importance not to dismiss statistical anomalies as nothing more than numerical oddities; we would hope that on the strength of the peculiarity of the findings in and of themselves, the scientifically inclined will be sufficiently intrigued by the curious nature of psi to want to find out for themselves what that anomaly might actually be.
Conclusion
On that point, Hyman (2010) claims the following:
Parapsychology will succeed in its quest to demonstrate its communications anomaly only when it can generate specific hypotheses that predict patterns of outcomes that are consistent, lawful, and independently replicable by parapsychologists and others. So far, careful assessment of the parapsychological literature does not justify optimism on this matter. (p. 490) In response, we believe had addressed these issues, and argue for a shift in mind-set: Instead of parapsychologists' giving the null hypothesis a chance (Alcock, 2003) , skeptics should give the alternative hypothesis a chance. In spite of the relatively limited pool of literature, we argue that consistency has been demonstrated in the data and that there is good evidence of replication by a range of investigators. We maintain that parapsychology is a struggling discipline despite its age, and we can only imagine where science might be if parapsychology had been given the same due attention that other disciplines have received over the same period.
